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I. INTRODUCTION 
When issuing drafting corporate debt instruments, issuers 
routinely place restrictive clauses in bond indentures that limit the 
ability of debtholders’ ability to sue the issuer.1  These restrictive 
                                                        
 Candidate for Doctor of Jurisprudence, University of Tennessee College 
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1 Akanthos Capital Mgmt., LLC v. CompuCredit Holdings Corp., 677 F.3d 
1286, 1298 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting that a no action clause is a “standard 
provision present in many trust indentures.”). 
 
provisions are called “no action” clauses.2 A well-drafted no-action 
clause protects an issuer from frivolous or unwarranted lawsuits by 
preventing individual or small groups of debtholders from bringing 
suits that are specious or unwelcome by the majority of the 
debtholders.3  However, since no action clauses may preclude claims 
from debtholders with legitimate grievances,  from bringing their 
claims in court, legal challenges to no action clauses frequently 
arise. 4   Consequently, thoughtful, precedent-informed drafting is 
essential when drafting a no action clause for a bond indenture. 
While courts in the vast majority of jurisdictions agree that no 
action clauses are generally enforceable, disputes concerning the 
scope and interpretation of no action clauses are common.5   The 
objective of this Article is to outline the general background and 
mechanics of a no action clause, draw the reader’s attention to recent 
case law that may affect a court’s interpretation of a no action clause, 
                                                        
2 Id. 
3  Conflict of Interests Between Indenture Trustee and Bondholders: 
Avoidance of "No Action" Clauses Prohibiting Bondholder Suits against the 
Obligor, 62 YALE L.J. 1097, 1098-99 (1953) (“[T]he ‘no action’ clause 
precludes specious suits instigated by attorneys who hope to receive 
lucrative fees from a true class action for all [debt]holders. And the debtor 
corporation is insulated from unwise court action by a few panicky 
[debt]holders, or from a possible multiplicity of suits engendered by 
individual [debt]holders' actions.”) (internal citations omitted); Florida Nat. 
Bank of Jacksonville v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 123 Fla. 525, 538 
(1936). 
4  Id. at 1099-1100 (“[I]n occasional circumstances, insistence on literal 
compliance with the “no action” clause might completely paralyze 
[debt]holders whose interests are being harmed.”).   
5 14 N.Y. JUR. 2D BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS § 336 (2015) (“Reasonable 
restrictions on the right of action of an individual holder of corporate bonds 
or other obligations, either in respect of the obligation or the security or 
both, have generally been upheld as valid.”); Quadrant Structured Products 
Co. v. Vertin, 23 N.Y.3d 549, 565 (2014) (“Defendants are correct that 
generally a no-action clause prevents minority securityholders from 
pursuing litigation against the issuer, in favor of a single action initiated by 
a Trustee upon request of a majority of the securityholders . . . .”); Dietzel 
v. Anger, 8 Cal. 2d 373, 376 (1937) (“The great majority of the cases hold 
the restrictive provision valid on the theory that the [debt]holders have, by 
agreement among themselves, imposed a condition precedent to the 
exercise of the right of any one of them to sue individually.”).. 
 
and, finally, to make drafting recommendations to the reader.  This 
Article will focus on the application and interpretation of no action 
clauses under New York law, since New York law governs the vast 
majority of corporate debt indentures.6  In particular, this Article will 
analyze issues addressed in the New York Court of Appeals’ decision 
in Quadrant Structured Products Co. v. Vertin (hereafter 
“Quadrant”) 7 and the 11th Circuit’s decision in Akanthos Capital 
Mgmt., LLC v. CompuCredit Holdings Corp (hereafter “Akanthos”).8   
This Article will proceed in four parts.  Part II will explain the 
general background, development, and mechanics of a no action 
clause.  In particular, Part I will explain the general standards of 
interpretation and exceptions to no action clauses that have been 
recognized in New York courts.  Next, Part III will introduce and 
detail recent decisions construing New York law that involve the 
enforceability of a no action clause.  Specifically, Part III will explain 
how the New York Court of Appeals’ decision in Quadrant increases 
the probability that a New York court will decline to enforce a no 
action clause under certain conditions.  Finally, Part IV will outline 
lessons learned from Quadrant and Akanthos can help a drafter 
maximize the probability that New York courts will enforce a no 
action clause in their indenture.  The Article will conclude with a 
summation at Part V. 
                                                        
6 REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS § 12:136 (2015) (“. . . most corporate 
indentures and many loan documents are governed by New York law and 
are to be litigated in New York courts . . . .”).  Many indentures that are 
drafted in other states will contain a choice-of-law provision that specifies 
that New York Law will govern the indenture.  See Akanthos Capital 
Mgmt., LLC v. CompuCredit Holdings Corp., 677 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th 
Cir. 2012) (“The trust indentures have a choice-of-law provision specifying 
that New York law governs the agreement.”). 
7 Quadrant Structured Prod.’s Co. v. Vertin, 23 N.Y.3d 549 (2014).  
8 Akanthos Capital Mgmt., LLC, 677 F.3d at 1292. In this case, the 11th 
Circuit interpreted New York law. 
 
 




A no action clause limits the ability of individual or small 
groups of debtholders to sue issuers by vesting the debtholder’s right 
to sue in a third party, the trustee.9  The third party trustee effectively 
holds legal title to the securities. 10   No action clauses for debt 
instruments are found in the indenture, which is a written agreement 
between the parties that sets forth, among other things, the 
obligations of the issuer, the debtholder’s rights and remedies in the 
event the issuer defaults, as well as the responsibilities of the 
trustee.11  For actions within the scope of the no action clause, it is 
the trustee, not the debtholder(s), who must bring suit.12  No action 
clauses can make bringing suit against an issuer an expensive and 
time-consuming endeavor.13  
No action clauses have been regularly upheld and enforced in 
the vast majority of jurisdictions, including New York. 14   The 
                                                        
9  Conflict of Interests Between Indenture Trustee and Bondholders: 
Avoidance of "No Action" Clauses Prohibiting Bondholder Suits against the 
Obligor, 62 YALE L.J. 1097, 1098-99 (1953) (“Under the ‘no action’ 
clause, [debt]holders' rights to sue the corporate debtor are vested in an 
independent trustee . . . .”). 
10 Quadrant Structured Prod.’s Co., 23 N.Y. at 555 (noting that an indenture 
is “a written agreement that bestows legal title of the securities in a single 
Trustee . . . .”) (citing George G. Bogert & George T. Bogert, THE LAW OF 
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 250 at 280 (2d ed. rev. 1992)).  
11 Quadrant Structured Prod.’s Co., 23 N.Y.3d at 555. 
12 Rabinowitz v. Kaiser-Frazer Corp., 111 N.Y.S.2d 539, 545 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1952) (“[O]rdinarily a request upon a trustee to take action must be 
made by the holders of the prescribed percentage of bonds before a class 
action may be instituted by a [debt]holder.”). Exceptions to this are 
discussed infra. 
13 James Gadsden, Indenture "No-Action" Clauses Bar Independent Claims 
by Securityholders, 130 BANKING L.J. 226, 228 (2013).  
14 14 N.Y. JUR. 2D BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS § 336 (2015) (“Reasonable 
restrictions on the right of action of an individual holder of corporate bonds 
. . . have generally been upheld as valid.”); Dietzel v. Anger, 8 Cal. 2d 373, 
376 (1937) (“The great majority of the cases hold the restrictive provision 
 
common rationale cited by courts in enforcing no action clauses is 
that debtholders, in effect, impose the restrictions on themselves.15  
Parties to an issuance of debt have the opportunity to review a no 
action clause before executing the indenture, giving debtholders 
ample opportunity to object or renegotiate the clause if they see fit.16  
In the same way, subsequent purchasers may review the indenture 
and no action clause before buying bonds.  However, scholarship 
suggests that debtholders rarely do so.17 
No action clauses have a long history of litigation, despite the 
presence of a substantial amount of case law supporting their general 
enforceability.  In fact, litigation over the interpretation and 
enforcement of no action clauses has occurred for over 70 years, 
particularly since the seminal case of Birn v. Childs Co. was decided 
in New York in 1942. 18   Cases such as Birn and Rabinowitz v. 
Kaiser-Frazer Corp. provide an early glimpse into the way New 
York courts interpret no action clauses.19  The general principles of 
                                                                                                                                
valid on the theory that the [debt]holders have, by agreement among 
themselves, imposed a condition precedent to the exercise of the right of 
any one of them to sue individually.”).. 
15 Dietzel v. Anger, 8 Cal. 2d 373, 376 (1937) (“The great majority of the 
cases hold the restrictive provision valid on the theory that the [debt]holders 
have, by agreement among themselves, imposed a condition precedent to 
the exercise of the right of any one of them to sue individually.”). 
16 Feldbaum v. McCrory Corp., No. CIV. A. 11866, 1992 WL 119095, at *7 
(Del. Ch. June 2, 1992) (“[I]n consenting to no-action clauses by 
purchasing bonds, plaintiffs waive their rights to bring claims that are 
common to all [debt]holders, and thus can be prosecuted by the trustee, 
unless they first comply with the procedures set forth in the clause or their 
claims are for the payment of past-due amounts.”). 
17  Efrat Lev, Adv., The Indenture Trustee: Does It Really Protect 
Bondholders?, 8 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 47, 49 (1999) (“Unfortunately, 
[debt]holders are usually unaware of the existence of the indenture, let 
alone its specific provisions.”).  
18 Birn v. Childs Co., 37 N.Y.S.2d 689 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1942).  While this 
case is a seminal case, it is not the earliest. Some disputes concerning issues 
related to no action clauses date back to the 19th Century.  See Farmers' 
Loan & Trust Co. v. N. Pac. R. Co., 66 F. 169, 170 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1895) 
(noting issues with trustee conflicts of interest). 
19 See generally Birn, 37 N.Y.S.2d at 689; Rabinowitz v. Kaiser-Frazer 
Corp., 111 N.Y.S.2d at 539. 
 
law introduced in Birn and Rabinowtiz are alive and well today.20  In 
addition, Rabinowitz and Birn established common law exceptions to 
the general rule that trustees, rather than debtholders, must bring suit 
under causes of action that fall within the scope of the no action 
clause.  
I. GENERAL INTERPRETATION OF NO ACTION CLAUSES 
 
As a general rule, aA trust indenture is a contract, which 
means that the interpretation and construction of a no action clause 
contained in an indenture is a matter of basic contract law.21  A no 
action clause that is complete, clear and unambiguous on its face will 
be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms.22  Therefore, 
when reading interpreting a no action clause, a court will “give effect 
to the precise words and language used.”23   
It is well settled that no action clauses will be strictly 
construed, and thus read narrowly,  and narrowly read by New York 
courts.24  In addition, New York courts’ commonly apply the maxim 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius may apply while interpreting no 
action clauses. 25  Under this theory, where a no action clause 
                                                        
20  The precedent of Birn and Rabinowitz concerning trustee-related 
exceptions for unreasonable refusal to sue and conflicts of interest are still 
valid under modern New York law.  See Akanthos Capital Mgmt., LLC v. 
CompuCredit Holdings Corp., 677 F.3d 1286, 1294 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(“Although courts applying New York law have found no-action clauses 
applicable as a general rule, they have been willing to abrogate that rule 
under one consistently acknowledged exception: when the trustee, by 
reason of conflict of interest or unjustifiable unwillingness, cannot properly 
pursue a remedy for trust beneficiaries.”). 
21 Quadrant Structured Products Co. v. Vertin, 23 N.Y.3d 549, 559 (2014) 
(citing Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 
1049 (2d Cir. 1982)); see also Thomas Lee Hazen, THE LAW OF 
SECURITIES REGULATION § 19.1, at 467 (6th ed.) (referring to indenture as 
a contract). 
22 Quadrant Structured Prod.’s Co., 23 N.Y.3d at 559-60.  
23 Id. at 60. 
24 Id. 
25 Id.; MeehanCombs Glob. Credit Opportunities Funds, LP v. Caesars 
Entm't Corp., 80 F. Supp. 3d 507, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 
expressly describes a particular cause of action, thing, or person to 
which it shall apply, a court will draw an irrefutable inference that 
what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted and 
excluded.26  
II. EXCEPTIONS TO NO ACTION CLAUSES 
Under certainsome circumstances, no action clauses are 
unenforceable and inoperative regardless of the language used or 
conditions contained in the clause. 27   In particular, there are two 
trustee-related exceptions that will render a no action clause 
unenforceable: (1) unreasonable refusal by the trustee to bring suit,28 
and (2) conflict of interest of the trustee.29  
First, a no action clause is unenforceable where a trustee 
unreasonably refuses to sue the issuer. 30   This exception can be 
studied by analyzing Birn. In Birn, the plaintiffs owned debt 
securities issued by Childs Co. 31   Pursuant to the indenture that 
governed the plaintiff’s securities, debtholders brought suit seeking 
to require the issuer, Childs Co., to comply with the terms of a bond 
indenture requiring the Childs Co. was required to payyment 
certainof funds to a sinking fund.32  The plaintiffs alleged that, at 
some point, Childs Co. defaulted on this obligation by not making the 
payments. 33   Pursuant to a no action clause found in the debt 
indenture, tThe debtholders plaintiffs in Birn provided the trustee, 
Empire Trust Company, with adequate notice of default and 
requested that the trustee bring suit.34  However, the trustee refused 
                                                        
26 Calenzo v. Shah, 976 N.Y.S.2d 555, 558 (2013) (describing the general 
effect of expressio unius est exclusio alterius). 
27 See generally Birn v. Childs Co., 37 N.Y.S.2d at 689; Rabinowitz v. 
Kaiser-Frazer Corp., 111 N.Y.S.2d at 546. 
28 Birn, 37 N.Y.S.2d at 689. 
29 Rabinowitz, 111 N.Y.S.2d at 546. 
30 Birn, 37 N.Y.S.2d at 697.  
31 Id. at 689. 
32 Id. at 696 (“Plaintiff gave the trustee written notice of what she claimed 
and I have found to be a completed event of default, viz., failure to comply 
with the sinking fund provision.”). 
33 Id. 
34 Id.  
 
to sue, insisting that no default had occurred.35  The Birn court found 
for the plaintiff, holding that a debtholder may bypass the trustee and 
sue the issuer directly where: (1) the trustee, after receiving proper 
notice and opportunity to bring suit, refuses to sue, and (2) the 
trustee’s refusal to bring suit is unreasonable.36 Therefore, a trustee’s 
unreasonable refusal to bring suit will render a no-action clause 
unenforceable, and the plaintiffs may sue the issuer directly. 
Second, a no action clause is unenforceable where the trustee 
has a conflict of interest, as demonstrated in Rabinowitz.  In 
Rabinowitz, debtholders, once again, sued the issuer to enforce a 
sinking fund provision in the bond indenture.37  The issuer moved to 
dismiss, claiming that the plaintiffs had not satisfied the conditions 
precedent to suit under the indenture’s no action clause.38  While the 
Rabinowtiz Court concluded that the plaintiffs did not satisfy the 
conditions of the no action clause, the court held that the clause was 
inoperative39 because the trustee, Bank of America, had created a 
conflict of interest by loaning money to the issuer after the indenture 
was executed. 40   The Rabinowtiz Court definitively stated, “[a]A 
trustee cannot be permitted to assume a position inconsistent with or 
in opposition to his trust. His duty is single, and he cannot serve two 
masters with antagonistic interests.” 41  Consequently, Rabinowitz 
holds that a conflict of interest between a trustee and an issuer can 
render a no action clause unenforceable.42  
In sum, a no action clause, while strictly construed, will be 
interpreted under the basic tenants of contract law. Specifically, New 
                                                        
35 Id.  
36 Id. at 697 (“Equity also allows other beneficiaries to sue upon causes of 
action vested in their trustees when the trustee unreasonably refuses to 
sue.”). 
37 Rabinowitz, 111 N.Y.S.2d at 542(“It is this failure of [issuer] to have 
assumed the obligations of the sinking fund and to have paid 25% of its 
annual profits into such fund which presents the crux of this case . . . .”). 
38 Id. at 540.  
39 Id. at 547 (“[I]t is my view that the ‘no action’ clause involved in the case 
at bar is inoperative and inapplicable.”). 
40 Id. at 546. 
41 Id.  
42 Id. at 547.   
 
York courts will attempt to give effect to the plain language of the 
clause, while also incorporating the maxim of expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius.  While the general enforceability of no action 
clauses is not widely disputed, drafters should be mindful that there 
are two trustee-related exceptions that will render no action clauses 
unenforceable: (1) unreasonable refusal on the part of the trustee to 
bring suit when requested, and (2) trustee conflicts of interest. 
B. MECHANICS OF A NO ACTION CLAUSE 
A conventional no action clause prevents debtholder(s) from 
bringing suit directly against an issuer, unless: (1) the type of action 
the issuer wants to bring falls outside the scope of the no action 
clause, (2) the debtholder(s)plaintiffs satisfy conditions set out in the 
no action clause,43 or (3) a common law trustee-related exception 
applies, such as conflict of interest.44  To understand the mechanics 
of a no action clause, it is best to analyze one.  A typical no action 
clause looks like this: 
Limitation on Suits. A Securityholder may pursue a 
remedy with respect to this Indenture or the Securities 
only if:  
(1) the Holder gives to the Trustee notice of a continuing 
Event of Default;  
(2) the Holders of at least 25% in principal amount of the 
Securities make a request to the Trustee to pursue the 
remedy;  
                                                        
43 Gadsen, supra note 137, at 1097-98 (“[B]ondholders may not sue the 
corporation unless the trustee fails to act after holders of a specified amount 
of indenture securities make written request upon the trustee for action and 
offer the trustee indemnity for its expenses.”) (internal citations omitted).  
These two conditions in particular are commonly found in no-action 
clauses. 
44 Rabinowitz, 111 N.Y.S.2d at 545 (“ . . . an individual [debt]holder has the 
right to bring a class action to protect his interests . . . whenever the 
Indenture Trustee has acted in such a manner as to put itself in a position 
where it cannot faithfully and competently discharge its duty as a 
fiduciary.”).  
 
(3) such Holder or Holders offer to the Trustee indemnity 
satisfactory to the Trustee against any loss, liability or 
expense;  
(4) the Trustee does not comply with the request within 
60 days after receipt of the request and the offer of 
indemnity; and  
(5) during such 60-day period the Holders of a majority 
in principal amount of the Securities do not give the 
Trustee a direction inconsistent with the request.45  
I. SCOPE OF THE CLAUSE 
When analyzing the sample no action clause, one should take 
particular notice of the scope of the clause.  This particular no action 
clause applies to suits arising both under the indenture and the 
underlying securities.  This is significant, as Quadrant held that if the 
no action clause fails to does explicitly state that the no action clause 
is applicable to suits arising from the underlying securities, the 
maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius will apply and limit 
the scope of a no action clause to actions arising under the 
indenture.46  This would exclude causes of action arising under the 
underlying securities.  This will be discussed in more detail infra at 
Part II and Part III.  In addition, the sample clause states that it 
applies to “Securityholders.”  In defining the parties to whom the 
indenture applies, dDespite this, drafters should be cautious, as New 
York law sometimes permits non-parties to an indenture–such as 
directors or officers–to assert and enforce a no action clause.47 
II. CONDITIONS OF THE CLAUSE 
The conditions debtholder(s) are required to meet to bring suit 
under the sample no action clause are common.  First, the clause 
                                                        
45 Gadsden, supra note 132, at 1228. 
46 Quadrant Structured Prod.’s Co., 23 N.Y.3d at 552 (“[W]e conclude that 
a trust indenture's ‘no-action’ clause that specifically precludes enforcement 
of contractual claims arising under the indenture, but omits reference to ‘the 
Securities,’ does not bar a securityholder's independent common-law or 
statutory claims.”). 
47 Akanthos Capital Mgmt., LLC, 677 F.3d at 1292 (“A number of courts 
applying New York law . . . have held that non-party defendants may still 
assert the no-action clause.”). 
 
requires the debtholder to give the trustee notice of the default.  In 
addition to notice, the debtholder(s) must give the trustee 60 days to 
sue before bringing suit themselves.  This gives the trustee time to 
evaluate the claim and determine whether the conditions of the no 
action clause have been satisfied and the claim is legitimate.  
Perhaps the most notable and, for debtholders, pesky 
condition contained in the sample no action clause is the requirement 
that the debtholder(s) who is petitioning the trustee to bring suit must 
be joined by the holders of at least 25% of the bondssecurities.  This 
condition is standard and the figure of 25% is customary and 
regularly enforced. 48   This condition can be difficult and time 
consuming for debtholder(s) to satisfy.  However, the Trust Indenture 
Act (the “TIA”) helps small debtholder(s) comply with these types of 
conditions, as the TIA requires issuers to furnish trustees with a list 
of all debtholders’ names and addresses.49 This disclosure facilitates 
communication between debtholders and the trustee and enables 
small debtholders to find and petition other debtholders to request the 
trustee to bring suit in order to comply with the conditions of the no 
action clause.  
The final conditions in the sample no action clause simply 
require aggrieved debtholders to offer an indemnity and respect a 60-
day holding period where the trustee can analyze the actions of the 
debtholders to see if the majority of debtholders undertake direction 
inconsistent with the aggrieved debtholder’s request.  While the 
conditions in the sample no action clause are typical; individual, 
negotiated no action clauses may be different.  Therefore, drafters 
should compare their no action clause with precedent in order to 
understand the way any changes from precedent could affect a 
court’s interpretation of their clause. Having discussed the general 
background and mechanics of no actions clauses, the next step 
involves understanding case law that aeffects the general application 
and interpretation of no action clauses. 
 
                                                        
48 Gadsden, supra note 132, at 1228 (“The 25% figure is standard.”). 
49 15 U.S.C. § 77lll (1990) (“Each obligor upon the indenture securities 
shall furnish or cause to be furnished . . . all information in the possession 
or control of such obligor, or of any of its paying agents, as to the names 
and addresses of the indenture security holders.”). 
 
 
III. THE IMPACT OF QUADRANT AND AKANTHOS 
 While drafting no action clauses under New York law, 
drafters may find it helpful to analyze past court decisions that have 
interpreted no action clauses when making drafting decisions.  
Having already explained the general rules of interpretation for no 
action clauses, this Part will focus on lessons that can be learned by 
analyzing recent court decisions interpreting that interpret no action 
clauses under New York law. This section will focus on a crucial 
lesson found in Quadrant, as well as important precedent established 
in the 11th Circuit’s decision in Akanthos. 
A. QUADRANT 
 
In Quadrant, the New York Court of Appeals provided 
guidance concerning the scope of no action clauses.50  The facts are 
relatively simple.  Athilon Capital Corp (“Athilon”) is a company 
that, along with a wholly owned subsidiary, sold credit derivatives 
products, such as credit default swaps.51  To finance its business, 
Athlon raised over $600 million by issuing three classes of notes: (1) 
$350 million in senior subordinated notes, (2) $200 million in three 
different series of subordinated notes, and (3) $50 million in junior 
notes.52  Quadrant Structured Products Company, Ltd. (“Quadrant”), 
the plaintiff, owned several classes of the subordinated notes, 
including some senior subordinated notes.53  A third company, EBF 
& Associates, L.P. (“EBP”) acquired Athilon in 2010, owned the 
junior notes, and controlled Athilon’s bBoard of dDirectors.54  The 
notes issued by Athilon were accompanied by indentures containing 
no action clauses, which were governed by New York law.55 
Quadrant brought suit in Delaware against Athilon, Athilon's 
officers and directors, EBF, and others, alleging breaches of fiduciary 
duty and fraudulent transfer claims and seeking damages and 
                                                        
50 Quadrant Structured Prod.’s Co., 23 N.Y.3d at 553. 
51 Id.  
52 Id. at 554.  
53 Id. at 554-55. 
54 Id. at 553. 
55 Id. at 556-57.  
 
injunctive relief. 56   Quadrant claimed that Athilon’s bBoard of 
directors, which is controlled by EBP, “failed to preserve Athilon's 
value in anticipation of liquidation in 2014” and breached its 
fiduciary duty by making payments on its junior notes, to the 
detriment of the senior subordinated securities, such as those owned 
by Quadrant.57  
In response, the defendant’s moved to dismiss the lawsuit on 
the grounds that Quadrant’s suit was barred by the debt indenture’s 
no action clause.58  The indenture’s no action clause provided that: 
No holder of any Security shall have any right by virtue 
or by availing of any provision of this Indenture to 
institute any action or proceeding at law or in equity or in 
bankruptcy or otherwise upon or under or with respect to 
this Indenture . . . .59 
In addition, the indenture required that “the holders of not less than 
50% of the aggregate principal amount of the relevant series of 
Securities at the time Outstanding” make request to the trustee to 
bring suit.60  This is in contrast to the standard figure of 25%.61   
The Delaware Chancery Court agreed with the defendants and 
dismissed Quadrant’s lawsuit, holding that the no action clause 
barred the plaintiff’s claims. 62   However, on appeal, Quadrant 
argued, for the first time, that the no action clause contained in 
Athilon’s indentures was inapplicable since the clause applied only to 
claims arising out of the indenture and therefore could not bar 
common-law or statutory claims arising under the securities.63  This 
defense arose from the fact that the language of the no action clause 
stated that it applied to claims arising under the indenture, rather than 
claims arising under the indenture or the Securities, as was the case 
                                                        
56 Id. at 556. 
57 Id.  
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 556-57. 
60 Id. at 557. 
61 Gadsden, supra note 132, at 1228 (“The 25% figure is standard.”). 
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in past precedent.64  The Delaware Supreme Court remanded the case 
back to the Delaware Chancery Court with instructions that the 
Chancery Court issue an opinion analyzing the significance (if any) 
under New York law of the differences between [the precedent clause 
and Athilon’s clause].65   The report concluded that the no action 
clause was limited in scope and only applied to “actions or 
proceedings where a securityholder claims a right by virtue or by 
availing of any provision of the indenture.” 66   The Delaware 
Supreme Court then certified two questions at issue to the New York 
Court of Appeals.67 
First, the New York Court of Appeals held that “a no-action 
clause which by its language applies to rights and remedies under the 
provisions of the indenture agreement, but makes no mention of 
individual suits on the securities, does not preclude enforcement of a 
debtholder’s independent common-law or statutory rights.” 68   In 
coming to this conclusion, the Quadrant Court reasoned that the no 
action clause at issue, “with its specific limit on the enforcement of 
indenture contract rights,” was in contrast to more standard no action 
clauses that also cover securities-based claims.69  Furthermore, the 
court cited the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius as 
supporting its conclusion.70  The defendants attempted to argue that 
“references to the indenture should be interpreted to include the 
securities, and that to do otherwise will upset the parties' 
expectations.”  However, the court dismissed this argument as 
unconvincing and unsupported by precedent and the plain language 
of the clause/indenture.71  
 The Quadrant Court makes it clear that any language in a no 
action clause that states that the clause shall apply or not apply to 
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certain claims will be strictly enforced and narrowly construed.72  In 
addition, under the precedent established by this decision, if a drafter 
wants a no action clause to apply to claims arising from the 
underlying securities, in addition to those arising under an indenture, 
the clause must explicitly say so. 73   Further drafting tips and 
suggestions from this precedent are addressed infra at Part III. 
B. AKANTHOS 
In Akanthos, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, interpreting 
New York law, provided clarity concerning who may invoke the 
protections of a no action clause.74  The plaintiffs in Akanthos owned 
convertible notes issued by the defendant, CompuCredit Holdings 
Corp.75   In 2009, the plaintiffs sued the defendant in the Federal 
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, alleging 
violations of Georgia’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act.76   The 
defendant moved to dismiss, claiming the lawsuit was barred by a no 
action clause contained in the notes’ indenture.77  The federal district 
court held that the no action clause was inapplicable to the claims 
brought by the plaintiffs, thus defeating the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss.78   On interlocutory appeal, the 11th Circuit reversed the 
district court, holding that the no action clause was operative and 
barred the plaintiff noteholders from bringing suit.79 
Before the 11th Circuit, the plaintiffs argued that the no 
action clause in the indenture was inapplicable because the parties 
seeking to enforce the no action clause, officers and directors of the 
defendant, were not parties to the indenture.80  This argument centers 
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on the scope of a no action clause.81 Can defendants who are not 
parties to an indenture invoke the protection of a no action clause?  In 
answering this question, the 11th Circuit held that “non-party 
defendants may still assert [a] no-action clause.”82  In reaching this 
decision, the Akanthos Court cited numerous opinions by New York 
courts that allowed non-parties to an indenture to invoke the 
protections of a no action clause. 83   The court reasoned that 
noteholders effectively waive their right to sue when they execute a 
no action clause and that this waiver “applies equally to claims 
against non-issuer defendants as to claims against issuers.”84  This is 
particularly true with no action clauses that “explicitly make their 
scope depend on the nature of the claims brought, not on the identity 
of the defendant.” 85   Accordingly, the 11th Circuit overruled the 
district court’s holding and enforced the no action clause.86 
Akanthos teaches drafters, and potential plaintiffs, a crucial 
lesson concerning the scope of no action clauses; defendants who are 
not parties to the underlying indenture may, depending on the 
language of the clause, be entitled tocan enforce no action clauses.  
This can be a problem for plaintiff noteholders, since Akanthos 
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claims.”). 
 
broadens the scope of parties protected by a no action clause. 87  
However, Akanthos also suggests a solution to this problem.  If a 
noteholder or issuer wants to limit the number of parties who 
canallowed to enforce a no action clause, Akanthos suggests that 
inserting language explicitly limiting the parties who may enforce a 
no action clause may be effective.88  This solution is hinted in the 
court’s citation of Feldbaum, where the court states that the general 
rule of allowing non-parties to an indenture to enforce a no action 
clause is especially applicable where clauses “explicitly make their 
scope depend on the nature of the claims brought, not on the identity 
of the defendant.”89  This suggests that where a no action clause 
expressly makes the scope of the no action clause dependent on the 
identity of the defendant, as well as the nature of the claim, then a 
court will be less likely to allow non-parties to an indenture to 
enforce a no action clause. This approach is also consistent with a 
basic tenants of contracts; enforcing the plain meaning of a clause.  
Quadrant and Akanthos provide drafters, potential plaintiffs 
and defendants with guidance concerning how New York courts will 
interpret a no action clause.  The most important lesson drafters can 
take away from these cases is that specificity and precision in 
drafting will pay a crucial role in the application and effectiveness of 
a no action clause.  Using the precedent set in Quadrant and 
Akanthos, along with analyzing the basic rules of interpretation for 
no action clauses discussed supra in Part I, we may now move 
forward to Part III, which will make suggestions to drafters. 
 
IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
After discussing and analyzing the general rules of 
interpretation for no action clauses, as well as the precedent of 
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Quadrant and Akanthos, it is clear that no action clauses, while 
generally enforceable, will be strictly and narrowly construed. 90  
Therefore when drafting, counsel to an issuer can maximize the 
likelihood that their no action clause will be enforced in New York 
by following a few simple suggestions. 
A. BE CAREFUL WHEN SELECTING A TRUSTEE 
To begin, one shouldpractitioners should counsel clients to be 
careful when selecting a trustee.91  The malfeasance or nonfeasance 
of a trustee can render well drafted no action clauses unenforceable.92  
In particular, since trustee conflicts of interest may render a no-action 
clause inapplicable, clients should undertake due diligence on the 
trustee to make sure that no potential conflicts of interests arise after 
the execution of the indenture.93  It is notable that Rabinowitz deals 
with a conflict of interest that arose after the execution of the 
indenture, so conflicts that precede an indenture may possibly be 
resolved by waiver or other means.94 
Avoiding trustee conflicts of interest is undoubtedly 
advantageous for an issuer. 95   For example, if the defendant in 
Rabinowitz had realized that receiving a loan from the trustee, Bank 
of America, would invalidate their no action clause, the defendant 
could have either sought financing from another source,  or appointed 
another trustee, or sought a waiver.96  If the defendant had taken 
these actions, the no action clause in Rabinowitz would have likely 
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been enforced and the plaintiff’s lawsuit dismissed. 97   Therefore, 
drafters should urge their client to use caution when selecting a 
trustee and establish safeguards to prevent trustee conflicts of interest 
from arising. 
In addition to taking steps to ensure that trustee conflicts of 
interest do not invalidate theeir no action clause, counsel should also 
make sure that trustees are aware of their duties and care competent 
to execute them.  For example, under the model no action clause in 
Part I(b), if the trustee fails to take action within 60 days, a 
debtholder may bypass the trustee and sue directly, provided all the 
other conditions are satisfied. 98   This means that inactivity or 
nonfeasance by the trustee can make it easier for disgruntled 
debtholders to sue.  In addition, it is well established that the 
malfeasance of a trustee can invalidate a no action clause where a 
trustee unreasonably refuses to sue an issuer.99   While this issue 
should rarely cause a problem, since most appointed trustees are 
large financial institutions , such as Bank of America, counsel would 
be wise to vet potential trustees for competency, as well as conflicts 
of interest. 
B. DRAFT NO ACTION CLAUSES WITH SPECIFICITY AND 
PRECISION 
After carefully selecting a trustee, counsel should be careful to 
draft their no action clause with specificity and precision.  Quadrant 
and Akanthos are two examples of cases where a no action clause 
could have been effective, but was not, due to the language the 
drafter chose to use.100  When it comes to no action clauses, details 
matter, particularly since courts will “give effect to the precise words 
and language used” in a no action clause. 101   For example, in 
Quadrant, if the drafter of Athlon’s no action clause had simply 
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stated that the no action clause prohibited any action “upon or under 
or with respect to this Indenture or the Securities,” then Quadrant’s 
lawsuit may have been dismissed.102  This is particularly true since 
the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, a factor the court 
relied upon when reaching its conclusion, would not have applied 
had the drafter included “the Securities” in the clause.  Quadrant is a 
shining example of how good, precedent-informed drafting can make 
or break a no action clause.  Indeed, it is arguable that, in light of the 
Quadrant decision, one should always include the “Securities” in the 
scope of a no action clause, unless there is a particular justification 
for its omission. 
Further reinforcing the idea that precise drafting is critical, the 
Akanthos decision suggests that anyone may enforce a no action 
clause unless the clause says otherwise.103  From the perspective of 
debtholders’ counsel, it would be wise, if possible, to negotiate limits 
on parties who can enforce a no action clause.  This would make it 
easier to sue non-parties to the indenture.   If the indenture in 
Akanthos, via express language, only permitted parties to the 
indenture to enforce the no action clause, then it is likely that the 
Akanthos Court would have held that the no action clause at issue 
was inapplicable and the lawsuit against the directors and officers of 
the issuer, non-parties to the indenture, could have continued. 104  
However, from a trustee and issuer’s perspective, it may benefit 
issuers to allow anyone to enforce the clause, since that interpretation 
would extend protection to not just the issuer, but also its officers and 
directors.105 
All in all, while no action clauses are strictly construed and 
narrowly read, New York courts have made it clear that they will 
enforce the plain meaning of the terms used in a no action clause, 
giving effect to the precise words and language used.106  Specific, 
precedent-informed drafting could have changed the outcomes of 
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Quadrant and Akanthos, so counsel should always consider 
precedent and the particular risks/needs of their client before drafting 
a no action clause.  
C. BE MINDFUL OF SCOPE 
Drafters should always be cognizant of the scope of a no action 
clause’s scope. It is easy to simply copy and paste a form no action 
clause from a precedent transaction, but good drafters should always 
evaluate the scope of the sample clause before inserting it into their 
indenture.  As mentioned supra, be mindful of whether the clause 
applies only to actions arising under the indenture, or whether the 
clause also forbids lawsuits arising from the underlying securities.  
Issuers’ counsel will likely desire for the scope of the no action 
clause to be as broad as possible, while debtholders may undoubtedly 
wantdesire a narrower clause.  Finally, remember that the maxim of 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies when considering the 
scope of no action clauses, particularly, in terms of parties who can 
enforce the clause and in terms of claims that fall under the clause’s 
protection.107  Whenhile this maxim applies, terms that are omitted 
from a no action clause will be assumed to be intentional omissions, 
as was the case in Quadrant.108  
D. EVALUATE THE CONDITIONS OF THE NO ACTION CLAUSE  
 
Finally, the conditions of a no action clause are of paramount 
concern when drafting a no action clause.  Ideally, the conditions will 
be strict enough to prevent specious lawsuits from a small number of 
debtholders,, but lenient enough to allow a substantial number of 
debtholders to sue for legitimate grievances.109  The most important 
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condition set by issuers is the requisite number of debtholders who 
must petition the trustee to sue.  As mentioned supra, a condition that 
requires holders of 25% of all outstanding bonds or notes to request a 
trustee to sue is standard and often enforced.110   
However, the indenture in Quadrant set a much higher 
standard, requiring that “holders of not less than 50% of the 
aggregate principal amount of the relevant series of Securities” 
petition the trustee.111  While the figure of 25% is standard, Quadrant 
suggests that issuer’s counsel has some leeway in setting this 
condition, since the Quadrant court didn’t invalidate the clause due 
to the 50% figure.112  Indeed, increasing the number from 25% to 
50% makes it more difficult for debtholders to sue, which makes 
increasing the figure attractive for issuers.  For safety’s sake, 
however, conservative issuers should stick with the 25% requirement 
since 25% is standard and there is always a risk that a court may 
invalidate a no action clause that contains draconianwith too harsh of 
conditions as void on public policy grounds.113  
Finally, drafters should make sure that trustees have sufficient 
time to review claims and petitions to sue in order to faithfully 
execute their duties as a trustee.  To this end, a condition, such as the 
example provided supra in the model no action clause that allows 
debtholders to bypass the trustee only after 60 days of inaction on the 
part of the trustee is recommended.  This condition gives the trustee 
sufficient time to review the claim and evaluate its legitimacy.  
Therefore, sticking with this condition and 60-day time frame, as 
noted in the model no action clause in Part I, is advisable.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, no action clauses can be a powerful tool for 
issuers.  The no action clause prevents specious and frivolous 
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lawsuits by small debtholders, yet allows a substantial number of 
debtholders with legitimate grievances to litigate their claims.  
Furthermore, the no action clause prevents a small number of 
debtholders from suing the company where the suit is antagonistic to 
the majority of debtholders.  In drafting no action clauses, counsel 
should vet potential trustees for conflicts of interest and competence 
and compare precedent clauses with the particular needs of their 
transaction.  Most importantly, counsel should always draft with 
specificity and precision, since New York courts will enforce the 
plain meaning of a no action clause.  By learning from the precedent 
of cases such as Quadrant and Akanthos, as well as considering the 
scope and conditions of their particular clause, drafters can maximize 
the probability that New York courts will enforce their indenture’s no 
action clause.  
